In what follows, the proper distinction between reference and predication is observed as well as the notion of a successful reference. In this regard, the role of the speaker’s intention is discussed. Reference is understood as a speech act performed in a particular speech situation, where interpretation is required to ascertain the use of an actual reference of a linguistic expression. The focus of an interpretation would be the speaker’s intention.
A speaker refers to an object by using a linguistic expression, e.g., a phrase, where the aim is to identify a particular member of a set, namely, the “referent.” The set itself is called the “denotatum.” The reference constitutes the relationship between the linguistic expression and the referent, viz., the object to which is being referred by the utterance of that expression (Lyons 1977:174-5). As Russell (1905) explained, definite noun-phrases (i.e., definite descriptions) denote an entity or a class of entities, e.g., “The President” for an entity of the class of presidents. Such expressions may also be used for the purpose of identification (Donnellan 1966:281). A single referring expression is usually the subject of the sentence, in combination with a predicative expression (Lyons 1977:178).
Now, a word as such does not carry reference (Herbst 2010:225; Searle 1969:22). The speaker, rather, “invests the expression with reference by the act of referring” (Lyons 1977:177). Reference, then, is carried by a referring expression used to identify particulars relative to a speech situation, as the speaker performs the act of referring. Accordingly, while the denotatum of a word remains the same, the referent varies relative to the object to which a speaker refers.
Reference, in this sense, is understood as a part of performing a speech act, viz., an act performed to identify an object by the utterance of a certain word (Herbst 2010:224; Searle 1969:26-9). Now, the act of referring and that of predicating[1] are distinct from the mere uttering of words (Herbst 2010:275). In the utterance of referring expressions, speakers intend to identify an object. Referring expressions are thusly known by their function, viz., in serving to identify particulars.
A singular definite referring expression (e.g., “The man”) is presumed as paradigmatic (Lyons 1977:178; Searle 1969:26-7). A particular object is to be identified by means of definite referring expressions, while in the case of indefinite referring expressions (e.g., “A man”) identification does not obtain.[2] Further, referring expressions are contradistinguished from non-referring expressions; the latter being predicative.
In examining singular definite reference, Searle (1969:28) proceeds from paradigmatic referring expressions in the English language. Three main kinds of singular definite reference may be stipulated: (1) definite noun phrases; (2) proper names[3]; and (3) personal pronouns. Given these categories, the question arises as to a successful reference. As Lyons (1977:181) remarks, a successful reference in terms of identification does not depend on the truth of the reference. Identification, rather, is a necessary condition for a complete[4] reference (Searle 1969:86). In case of a complete reference, an object is identified unambiguously for the hearer. But reference may be rendered successful despite ambiguity, if the speaker can provide such answers as would allow the hearer to identify the object in question (Searle 1969:85-6). The reference, otherwise, remains incomplete.
Now, Searle (1969:27) considers predicative utterances, such as “John is a man,”[5] to be indicative of a “non-referring” use of expressions. However, as Lyons (1977:188-190) notes, an indefinite noun-phrase can be used either non-specifically or with a specific reference. A referring expression (“It nests in the grounds of the chateau”), though indefinite given “It,” may on a certain interpretation have a specific reference, presupposing a certain object. In this case, the linguistic expression operates in much the same way as a definite referring expression, although the referent would not be immediately identified for the hearer as in the latter case. A non-referential use of a noun-phrase would not presuppose a certain object.
Further, as Lyons (1977:185) argues, a definite noun-phrase may occur as the complement of the verb “to be.” Its function, in that case, would be predicative, rather than referential.[6] Also, Donnellan (1966:285) maintains that a definite noun-phrase (e.g., “The murderer of Smith is insane”), as the subject of a sentence, can be applied non-referentially, in such cases where the phrase would be applied so as to attribute a feature to the subject, relative to the speaker’s intention, intonation, and stress, in the context of a speech situation (Donnellan 1966:297; see also Lyons 1977:186).[7] The difference between these uses matters for a successful reference. In the case of a definite noun-phrase used referentially, the speaker is presumed to believe that an object fits the description. If nothing seems to fit the description, the speaker might yet make an eventual true statement given a correction. However, if nothing fits the description of a phrase used attributively, the speaker will not succeed in making a true assertion (Donnellan 1966:292).
In conclusion, a definite noun-phrase is not ipso facto a referring expression. Reference is understood in context, given the speaker’s intention and utterances at a given moment. To ascertain reference, an interpretation of the speaker’s intention, given his utterances, is required, within the context of the speech situation in question.
Sources
Donnellan, K. S. (1966). Reference and definite descriptions. The Philosophical Review, 75(3), 281. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183143
Herbst, Thomas. (2010). English linguistics. A coursebook for students of English. De Gruyter Mouton.
Lyons, John. (1977). Semantics I. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139165693
Quine, W.V. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Russell, B. (1919). Introduction to mathematical philosophy. George Allen & Unwin.
Russell, B. (1905). II. — On denoting. Mind, XIV(4), 479–493. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xiv.4.479
Searle, John R. (1969). Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge university press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139173438
[1] Searle (1969:26-9) calls referring and predicating “propositional acts.”
[2] As discussed below, Lyons (1977:188-190) presents a caveat to a non-referential use of indefinite referring expressions.
[3] Proper names are a paradigmatic example of singular definite reference, though not all occurrences of proper names are referential (Searle 1969).
[4] In Searle’s (1969:81-2) terminology, a complete reference is called a “fully consummated” reference.
[5] By contrast, such utterances, for Russell (1919), are understood as “identity statements.” Searle (1969:27) rejects Russell’s notion that predicative statements can be used for identification, the absurdity of which would be shown by a negative form of a predicative statement. E.g., “John is not a man” would be understood as referring to “a man” John is not.
[6] As Lyons (1977:185) remarks, in this context, the predicative and the equative copula are identical in English, where the verb “to be” is used in both cases.
[7] The referential or attributive use of expressions, according to the intention of the speaker in question, relates to their “extensionality,” i.e., truth functionality (Quine 1960:141; Lyons 1977:192).